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Due to increasing waterborne transportation in the Gulf of Finland, the risk of a 
hazardous accident increases and therefore manifold preventive actions are needed. As a 
main legislative authority in the maritime community, The International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) has set down plenary laws and recommendations which are e.g., 
utilised in the safe operations in ships and pollution prevention. One of these 
compulsory requirements, the ISM Code, requires proactive attitude both from the top 
management and operational workers in the shipping companies. In this study, a cross-
sectional approach was taken to analyse whether the ISM Code has actively enhanced 
maritime safety in the Gulf of Finland. The analysis included; 1) performance of the 
ISM Code in Finnish shipping companies, 2) statistical measurements of maritime 
safety, 3) influence of corporate top management to the safety culture and 4) comparing 
safety management practices in shipping companies and port operations of Finnish 
maritime and port authorities. The main results found were that maritime safety culture 
has developed in the right direction after the launch of the ISM Code in the 1990´s. 
However, this study does not exclusively prove that the improvements are the 
consequence of the ISM Code. Accident prone ships can be recognized due to their 
behaviour and there is a lesson to learn from the safety culture of some high standard 
safety disciplines such as, air traffic. In addition, the reporting of accidents and near-
misses should be more widely used in shipping industry. In conclusion, there is still 
much to be improved in the maritime safety culture of the Finnish Shipping industry, 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Juha Heijari, Kotka Maritime Research Centre 
 
Intercontinental maritime transportation has been in continuous increase due to the 
globalization of markets. For example, during the period from 1995 to 2006, world 
maritime container traffic (measured in TEU) increased over 200% and world gross 
domestic product (GDB in 2007 US dollars) almost doubled in this time period (U.S. 
Department of Transportation, 2007). From the European point of view, the largest port 
handling maritime cargo (weight of seaborne goods) are Rotterdam (Netherlands), 
Antwerp (Belgium), Hamburg (Germany), Marseille (France) and Amsterdam 
(Netherlands), respectively (Amerini, 2010). Finnish ports handle approx. 3% of the 
European level volumes in 2007 (Amerini, 2009). The increase in handled volumes both 
in import and export has been (in 2006  2007) approximately 2.5% in Europe, but the 
economic downturn has downgraded shipping volumes on a global scale (Amerini, 
2010).  
 
In future prospect, shipping is expected to be the most important means of transport in 
intercontinental and, in many cases, in continental haulage. In Europe, the Baltic Sea 
and especially the Gulf of Finland has considerable importance for seaborne 
transportation (Kuronen & Tapaninen, 2009). The increasing export of oil from Russia 
constitutes a major share of volumes transported through the Gulf of Finland and the 
country is the European Union’s most important partner (United States of America is 
second) measured in handled (import and export) gross weight of goods (Amerini, 
2010). The increase in seaborne cargo in the Baltic Sea countries has been close to the 
European level (Figure 1). Furthermore, in Finnish ports, arrivals in foreign traffic have 
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Figure 1. The number of arrivals (solid line) in foreign traffic in the Finnish ports during 1970 – 2008 
(data from Statistics on Shipping between Finland and Foreign Countries, 2008) and the gross weight 
(dash line) of seaborne goods handled in EU 15 countries’ ports during 1998 – 2008 (data from Sea 
transport of goods, 2010) 
 
In relation to growing waterborne transportation, the risks for accidents increase in the 
vulnerable Baltic Sea and the Gulf of Finland. Transportation of oil in the Gulf of 
Finland accounts for 56% of total maritime goods transported (Kuronen & Tapaninen, 
2009). A maritime accident, similar to the British Petroleum oil rig accident in the Gulf 
of Mexico on 22 May, 2010, would be catastrophic to the Gulf of Finland’s economy, 
environment and everyday life. In order to combat against these kinds of accidents, so 
called “ex ante” operations are required. A few examples of opposite “ex post” 
operations are the cleaning of the shore of spilled oil or claims for loss of revenue from 
the parties responsible for the spill. 
 
Maritime safety in the Gulf of Finland has enhanced due to several “ex ante” operations, 
such as acts of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and preventive actions of 
the United Nations, establishment of the intergovernmental organization Helsinki 
Commission (HELCOM), Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) based of Automatic 
Identification System (AIS) and a mandatory reporting system named Gulf of Finland 
Reporting System (GOFREP). Even though the awareness of the increased risk for 
accidents has ignited several operations to prevent accidents, still approximately 22 to 
34 accidents occur annually in the Gulf of Finland (Kujala et al., 2009). The current 
regulations, guidelines, assessments, codes etc. have to be functional and easy to 
implement for them to be successful in preventing accidents. The future prospects are an 
enhanced usability of maritime traffic surveillance and new innovations (European 
Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, 2009). The methods (not regulatory) in 
proactive operations against possible accidents are, for example, the utilisation of 
improved global maritime surveillance (Høye et al., 2008; Coleshill et al., 2010), 
probability modelling of vessel collision (Monteweka et al., 2010), enhanced shipping 
accident investigations (Celik et al., 2010; Salmi, 2010), cross-disciplinary studies 
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(human factor, Bayesian networks; Kelmola et al., 2009) and functional policy 
instruments (Kuronen & Tapaninen, 2009). 
 
The ro-ro ship Estonia capsized and sunk in heavy weather in September 1994. The 
primary reason for the accident was a failure and loosing of the ship’s bow visor. 
Hänninen (2007) analysed the report of the investigation board thoroughly in his 
doctoral thesis concerning the Estonia accident. Hänninen (2007) stated that the cause 
of the Estonia accident was not only a technical failure of the bow visor, but also that 
there are major defects in the safety culture of the maritime industry. 
 
Even before the Estonia accident occurred, deficiencies in maritime safety culture were 
considered as the reason for the accident of the Herald of Free Enterprise (FMA, 2007). 
Among other fatal accidents that occurred in the late 1980’s, the accident of the Herald 
of Free Enterprise triggered concern about the maritime safety culture among 
international maritime authorities. As a result, the IMO provided an International Safety 
Management Code (ISM Code) in 1993. 
 
This is the final report of project METKU “Developing Maritime Safety Culture” that 
was carried out in Kotka Maritime Research Centre during 2008 – 2010. One of the 
aims of the research project was to evaluate the impacts of the ISM Code on the 
maritime safety culture in Finland. The research partners were Aalto University, the 
University of Turku, the Centre for Maritime Studies, Kymenlaakso University of 
Applied Sciences and Turku University of Applied Sciences. The METKU project was 
funded by the European Union, Regional Council of Päijät-Häme, the City of Kotka and 
private companies. We investigate the abovementioned specific questions in five short 
concluding articles below. 
 
The aim of the METKU project was to gather a holistic view on the development of 
maritime safety in the Gulf of Finland during the past decade. Our aim specifically was 
to analyse: 1) the impact of the ISM Code on maritime safety culture, 2) the  tools for 
identifying risk factors for individual ships, 3) to compare other high standard safety 
management systems, 4) the influence of human factor in accident probability, 5) the 
influence of corporate top management to safety culture and 6) the need for directions 
and guidelines for the authority networks.  
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2  ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT CODE 
 
Jouni Lappalainen, Anne Vepsäläinen & Ulla Tapaninen, University of Turku 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
The purpose of the International Safety Management Code (ISM Code) has been to 
promote safety culture for the maritime industry. The fundamental philosophy of the 
ISM Code is the philosophy of continuous improvement. Investigating incidents is an 
integral component of the process of continuous improvement in safety management 
systems. According to IMO, learning from accidents should help to improve safety 
performance since the incidents can share the same underlying causes as losses. (IMO, 
2008)  
 
The purpose of the study is to recognize whether the safety culture has improved due to 
the ISM Code and evaluate the impacts of the ISM Code on maritime safety in Finland. 
The research project consists of a literature study and focused interviews which were 
carried out in autumn 2008 and spring 2009. The research questions are:  
 
• Is there an established and actively working process of continuous improvement? 
• Is the top management of the company committed to safety issues? 
• Is there motivated and encouraged personnel onboard to actively initiate safety 
improvements (personnel empowerment)? 
 
2.2  Target and structure 
 
The target was to study the development of the Finnish maritime safety culture 
considering the effects of the ISM Code from the mid-1990's to the present. The work 
consisted of three parts: a literature review, interview studies and finally, premises of 
incident reporting was studied.  
 
The purpose of the literature review was to provide us with a preliminary understanding 
of the research problem. When examining the existing literature, we tried to find out and 
recognize the means and methods for eliciting the changes in the organisational culture. 
Moreover, we tried to find out the prerequisites for a good safety culture. Earlier studies 
on the impact of the ISM Code have been based on quantitative methods, such as 
structured questionnaires, the results of which have been analysed statistically.  
 
The purpose of the interview study was to collect the maritime personnel’s subjective 
perceptions of the maritime safety culture in Finland. The results of the interviews were 
analysed qualitatively. A total of 94 people were interviewed in this interview study. All 
those who were interviewed were actively working in the Finnish shipping business. 
Almost all had a maritime education and maritime working experience. Every person 
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interviewed had worked with the ISM Code based safety management system. Almost 
all were Finnish citizens.  
 
The shipping companies involved comprehensively represent the Finnish maritime 
industry. There were seven shipping companies involved in the study, which widely 
represent the Finnish shipping business. All important shipping business areas were 
represented. We visited 16 ships during the project. These were passenger ships, 
ROPAX ships and all types of cargo ships. The combined fleet of the shipping 
companies represents a large proportion of the total Finnish fleet. The other stakeholder 
organisations are involved in safety management on a daily basis. They have a 
comprehensive idea of the current safety culture of the Finnish shipping business due to 
their close cooperation with Finnish shipping companies and their personnel. 
 
The interview study revealed that the Finnish shipping companies have not been able to 
fully implement the incident reporting and analysing to reach continuous improvement, 
which is one of the core targets of the ISM Code. Therefore, it was considered 
important to closely examine the premises of incident reporting. The aim of this study, 
then, was to find answers to the questions; what is IMO’s standpoint on incident 
reporting and investigation, how can this standpoint be seen in the light of the 
theoretical background and can the chosen standpoint have the desired effects? In 
addition, the existing reporting and investigation schemes were reviewed.  
 
2.3  Main results 
2.3.1  Literature review 
 
The literature review showed us that the ISM Code has brought a significant 
contribution to the progress of maritime safety during recent years (Lappalainen, 2008). 
Shipping companies and crews are more environmentally friendly and more safety-
oriented than they were 12 years ago (Lappalainen, 2008). Othman (2003) states that 
most (80%) of Malaysian shipping companies have implemented their safety 
management systems effectively according to the requirements of the ISM Code. The 
member states of the Paris MoU (2008) conducted a Concentrated Inspection Campaign 
(CIC) which focused on the effectiveness of the ISM Code. The Paris MoU (2008) 
discovered that most of the shipping companies and crews on vessels understand safety 
and implement it. The Tokyo MoU (Tokyo MOU, 2008) conducted a CIC 
simultaneously with the Paris MoU. Nevertheless, the direct effects and influence of the 
ISM Code on maritime safety could not be specified very well. No quantitative 
measurements (statistics/hard data) could be found to describe the impacts of the ISM 
Code on maritime safety (Mejia, 2001; Anderson, 2003; IMO 2005 ReportISM, 2008). 
In the light of the literature review (Lappalainen, 2008), there are major shortcomings 
concerning effective safety management in the maritime industry. 
 
The recent studies (Mejia, 2001; Anderson, 2003; IMO 2005, ReportISM, 2008) 
showed that near-misses are not perfectly reported. Some mariners are still reluctant to 
expose their mistakes (Withington, 2006; Anderson, 2003). The Paris MoU (2008) 
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reported that one of the most common deficiencies in safety management systems 
concerns the reporting of nonconformities and occurrences of accidents. Hence, there is 
still room for improvement in the reporting of deficiencies and non-conformities in the 
maritime industry. The proper reporting of deficiencies and non-conformities 
establishes a basis for continuous improvement. Furthermore, Anderson (2003) 
discovered that in certain cases, further analysis of, and corrective actions on the 
reported incidents were not properly carried out. Under these circumstances, a 
successful cycle of continuous improvement cannot function (Lappalainen, 2008). 
 
Some shipping companies prefer short-term profits at the expense of maritime safety 
(Anderson, 2003). The Paris MoU (2008) reported as a result of the CIC that 176 ships 
were detained due to serious deficiencies violating the requirements of the ISM Code. 
The reasons for the detentions were that the maintenance of the ship and its safety 
equipment were badly neglected. The status of emergency preparedness was poor as 
well. (Paris MoU, 2008; ReportISM, 2008). Evidently, the top management is not 
committed to safety issues in poorly performing shipping companies (Lappalainen, 
2008). 
 
Pun et al. (2003) stated that a high turnover of labour force could prevent the 
establishment of a safety culture in the maritime industry. Anderson (2003) also 
emphasized that establishing a safety culture is not easy when the turnover of the crew 
is high. The British Maritime and Coastguard Agency expressed the same concern in 
their study in 2008. The transient nature of the workforce with a relatively long distance 
between the ship owner and the vessel complicate the progress of safety management 
(ReportISM, 2008). 
 
We discovered that a safety culture has emerged and it is developing in the maritime 
industry. Even though the roots of the safety culture have been established, serious 
obstacles still remain to the breakthrough of safety management. These obstacles could 
be envisaged as cultural factors obstructing the safety process. Even though the ISM 
Code has been effective for over a decade, long-established behaviours based on the 
maritime culture of the old days still occur. (Lappalainen, 2008)  
 
2.3.2  Interview study 
 
We conducted a field survey which had the main target of investigating the opinions 
and attitudes of active seafarers employed by Finnish shipping companies. The field 
survey consisted of 94 interviews, which were carried out as in-depth interviews.  
 
The Finnish maritime community felt that the top management is committed to safety 
management and the application of the ISM Code. The top management assured that 
they considered safety as a value, and their companies had taken safety issues into 
consideration in all of their operations. It was observed that a major proportion of the 
personnel working in the top management supported and encouraged their personnel by 
providing adequate resources for safety work and by communicating actively on safety 
issues. The maritime personnel mostly felt that the commitment of the management 
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with regard to safety issues has improved and reasonable safety initiatives have been 
supported by the management. The management had provided financial support and 
other resources for safety improvements when necessary. The common view of the 
maritime inspectors was that the top management of the Finnish shipping companies is 
highly committed to safety management. (Lappalainen & Salmi, 2009)  
 
Majority of interviewees said that the communications of shipping companies have 
improved. Communications with the companies’ officers have also improved, especially 
the communication with the DPs. Our findings show that communication between the 
masters of the ships and the crew has significantly improved. Some interviewed 
managers indicated that the personnel should more actively put forward proposals and 
initiatives concerning safety aspects. Furthermore, the majority of interviewed maritime 
inspectors said that maritime personnel are not afraid to express themselves to their 
superiors. (Lappalainen & Salmi, 2009) 
 
During the studied implementation phase (1995 – 2009) of the ISM Code, the safety 
management system confronted resistance to change. That resistance has weakened 
during the last decade. The maritime personnel’s safety attitudes have improved. The 
willingness to participate in safety training has been a good indicator of this. The groups 
that were interviewed had a common concern about the functioning of the continuous 
improvement process. The reluctance to make incident reports indicated that the 
continuous improvement process was not functioning properly. Many interviewees said 
that incident reporting should be encouraged by superiors. (Lappalainen & Salmi, 2009) 
 
2.3.2  Utilization of incident reporting 
 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) encourages shipping companies to have 
procedures to report and analyse non-conformities, accidents and hazardous situations 
(IMO, 2002). In its Guidance on near-miss reporting (IMO, 2008), IMO emphasises the 
importance of near miss reporting because “learning the lessons from near-misses 
should help to improve safety performance since near-misses can share the same 
underlying causes as losses”. 
 
In the 1930s, Heinrich (1959) introduced a theory of different incident relations. Most 
known of the hypotheses base on this theory is the iceberg model, whereby for every 
serious accident there are several less serious accidents and near miss cases. This 
hypothesis is widely accepted. Through the iceberg model Heinrich also presented two 
other hypotheses: the domino theory and identical causation hypothesis. The domino 
theory is an accident model, in which models how accidents originate. The identical 
causation hypothesis states that different incidents have same kind underlying reasons. 
These two theories are widely argued. Therefore it should be taken into consideration 
whether IMO’s guidance on near miss reporting (IMO, 2008) can have the desired 
effects. 
 
The main finding concerning existing incident reporting systems is that information 
now flows more from the ships to systems and external institutions when it should be 
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the other way around. Based on this, it is highly recommended that actions to spin the 






















Figure 2.1 Suggested information flow between actors in maritime incident reporting 
 
Additionally, there are already statistics and investigation reports on Finnish maritime 
incidents – such as serious accidents and injuries – but the statistics and reports are 
scattered in the databases of different interest groups. To use that already existing 
knowledge in safety work, it is crucial that those databases are united in one shared 
database. In the best scenario this collective database could gather all essential 
information on maritime related incidents: statistics, IWFA reports, AIBF reports, 
vessels’ incident reports etc. In this way all the information would be easily available 
for those who for they are created – the seafarers. Furthermore, seafarers should be 
encouraged to read the incident reports and go them through with their fellow workers. 
The pure existence of the data does not ensure that it is used in the safety work. 
 
The shortcoming of internal incident reporting on the Finnish ships that was revealed in 
the interview study (Lappalainen & Salmi, 2009) can be explained, according to 
literature, by the notice that there seems to be a cultural gap between the personnel 
onboard and the management and administration ashore. The referred studies (Sanne, 
2008; Knudsen, 2009; Antonsen, 2009) can be brought together with a hypothesis of 
two different approaches on safety work. These are a technical approach and a social 
approach on safety management. The first is adopted by the management and the 
administration, and the latter by the seafarers. The technical approach on safety 
management leans on technical systems, statistics, and standardization when the social 
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approach leans on rules of thumb, storytelling, and seamanship. To get the best possible 
outcome of the incident reporting, these two approaches should be combined. 
 
2.4  Summary 
 
During the study we performed an interview study which was targeted at the Finnish 
maritime personnel, shipping companies and maritime authorities to reveal their 
appraisals concerning the impacts of the ISM Code. Almost one hundred representatives 
of the maritime industry were interviewed. We discovered that the main objective of the 
ISM Code has been achieved in the Finnish shipping industry.  
 
The maritime safety has been improved and thus the risk of environmental damage has 
consequently been decreased. The study showed that the requirements of the ISM Code 
have been implemented effectively in the studied shipping companies. It is important 
that the top management and the personnel of the shipping companies have accepted the 
ISM Code as an essential safety measure. One of the main concerns is the 
comprehension of the philosophy of continuous improvement. Tools for continuous 
improvement should be developed and they should be taken into practice. The other 
problems include the lack of uniformity in the interpretation and implementation of the 
ISM Code. The wider problem in the maritime industry is the excessive bureaucracy 
ships have to deal with.  
 
The results of the interview study were parallel with the results of the literature review 
(Lappalainen, 2008). The interview study found similar success factors and similar 
obstacles in the application of the ISM Code and safety management systems. The 
interviewees named similar gained benefits from the use of the ISM Code. Similarly, 
the defects and concerns matched the results of earlier studies. 
 
Finally we studied the incident reporting more closely. The main finding concerning 
existing incident reporting systems was that information now flows more from the ships 
to systems and external institutions when it should be the other way around. There are 
also a technical approach and a social approach on safety management. The first is 
adopted by the management and the administration, and the latter by the seafarers. To 
get the best possible outcome of the incident reporting, these two approaches should be 
combined. 
 
2.5  Further research 
 
In our study we found out that the safety culture of the Finnish shipping industry has 
improved. Shipping companies and ships’ crews are more environmentally conscious 
and safety-oriented than a decade ago. However, there is still much to be done. One of 
the main observations was that the technical and social aspects of safety culture should 
both be improved. 
 
In the future we will study the relationship between the level of performance of the 
safety management system and the business competitiveness of the shipping company. 
16     Heijari & Tapaninen 
By doing this, we expect to find reasons and means to improve the safety culture on all 
levels of the shipping companies, e.g. improving the mariners’ working conditions has a 
direct effect on the social well-being of workers as well as on the economic profit of the 
company, and even its competitive advantage. Furthermore, we encourage the 
international cooperation between organisations involved in enhancing maritime safety. 
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3  COMPARING SAFETY MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
 
 
Mirva Salokorpi & Jorma Rytkönen, Kymenlaakson ammattikorkeakoulu, University of 
Applied Sciences 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter briefly describes the methods and results of the study where different 
safety management systems were compared with each other. One primary aim of this 
study was to compare safety management practices of shipping companies and in port 
operations. Moreover, analyses were carried out to recognize best practices and lessons 
learned among different bodies and stakeholders and different industries. Thus, wider 
research was performed to find out similarities in safety related ISO codes and safety 
management practices in governmental bodies. The main objective of the whole study 
was to collect good safety management practices both for ports and shipping companies. 
In this article, the single best practices from different branches are presented. Next, best 
practices for shipping companies and maritime authorities are introduced. Finally, port 
safety matters are discussed in the last chapter. 
 
The research methods were literature reviews and interviews. In the maritime sector 
there were seven shipping companies that participated in the research. Several mariners, 
maritime authorities and classification company personnel were interviewed. The 
gathering of data from the port industry and its safety management practices was done 
by interviewing both port managers and employees of the company operating at the ort 
area. The best practices from the other branches were found by interviewing safety 
managers or suchlike, as well as supervisory authorities. 
 
Three reports were produced during this study: “Comparison with safety management 
systems” (Kunttu, 2009), “Safety management at ports” (Salokorpi, 2010a) and “Best 
safety management practices for shipping companies and ports” (Salokorpi, 2010b). 
The reports are written in Finnish. Moreover, three bachelor´s theses were made during 
this study: “Implementation of Safety Management System in Ports and in Enterprises 
Operating in Ports” (Koivistoinen, 2009), “Notions of Authorities about Safety 
Management” (Juurijoki, 2010) and “Notions of Surveyors of Classification Company 
about Safety Management” (Hämäläinen, 2010). 
 
3.2  Best safety management practices on a few chosen branches  
 
The objective of the study was to gather the best safety management practices, and the 
most remarkable sources of information were the branches, which are known for their 
developed safety culture, like the aviation and nuclear power industries. Below, we 
present a selection of the best safety management practices in various fields. Different 
safety related ISO codes (like ISO 9000, 14000, etc.) were not such important sources 
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of information that presenting them in this article would be reasonable. The best safety 
management practices used in maritime or port industries are neither described, as they 
are after all objects of the development. About these all were written in the actual 
reports of the study. 
 
3.2.1  Aviation 
 
The improvement of safety has a long tradition in aviation industry and there have been 
many different safety management systems in use. Along with a new EU directive, 
which will be enforced in 2012, a concept of Safety Management System (SMS) created 
by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) will be introduced in Finland. 
The concept is a vast integrated system, which will fuse together all the different present 
systems (Finnish Aviation authority, 2009). ICAO (2008) has published a Safety 
Management Manual (SMM), where the whole concept is presented. In this project, the 
analysis and comparing only focus on the ICAO’s system and the manual. 
 
There are many best practices in the concept of SMS and it is impossible to present each 
one in this chapter. In addition to this short description, the concept is referred to several 
times in the last part of the text. 
 
One significant best practice in the aviation industry is that safety management is seen 
as an elementary part of the everyday business. It is not only a duty that has to be 
accomplished (Finnish Aviation authority, 2009). Another good example is the guiding 
approach of authority and legislations to control the safety management process of 
service providers. The ICAO safety management system manual was designed to 
facilitate the implementation of SMS (Werfelman, 2008). The process of establishing a 
safety management system with the main principle of achieving an easy but functionally 
sound system is described in detail in the manual. It contains a lot of cases and 
examples to support the implementation of a safety management system. One good 
example of the thoroughness of the manual is the detailed definition of certain terms 
such as hazards and safety risks with good examples of consequences to illustrate the 
definition of the risk itself (Kunttu, 2009). 
 
Risk management is one of the priorities in ICAO systems. The manual describes the 
risk identification phases well and offers support on how to recognize risks. The safety 
performance concept is one of the key parameters and ways to measure the real 
effectiveness of the safety management system onboard (Kunttu, 2009). 
 
3.2.2  Nuclear power 
 
Safety requirements for nuclear power plants in Finland are principally based on two 
laws; the Radiation Act (592/1991) and the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987). The 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority in Finland (STUK) has defined guidelines for 
management systems for nuclear facilities (The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
Efficiency of the ISM Code in Finnish shipping companies      19 
in Finland, 2008). According to these guidelines, an integrated management (safety and 
quality) is required (The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority in Finland, 2009). 
 
Some of the best practices in nuclear power industry are listed below (they are collected 
from interviews with the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority in Finland, 2009): 
 
 There is international support and a special Safety Culture Assessment Team 
(SCART) offered by the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, to 
evaluate and develop safety related actions.  Their assistance has often proven 
valuable. 
 The authority has set indicators which are monitored. If changes occur in the 
indicators, the authority will react to them accordingly. 
 Risk assessment is an advanced practice of the branch. There has to be a risk 
assessment system based on probabilities incorporated in the systems. Root 
causes for nuclear accidents are identified by modelling different cases. 
 There is an obligation for the nuclear power plant (NPP) operator to maintain the 
facilities safe at all times. For this reason they have to present a long-term 
development plan to the authority each year. 
 Recent attention has been given to integrated management. Previously, they 
required that quality management and security were treated as separate entities, 
but now also managers should have an idea of how such an investment decision 
affects safety. 
 Both Finnish NPP operators have safety groups, which deal with safety issues. 
 
3.2.3  Chemical industry 
 
Seveso Directive, which came into force in 1999, requires a safety management system 
complying with the Directive, where the so-called Seveso establishments are defined 
(where dangerous substances are present in quantities exceeding the thresholds in the 
directive European Commission, 2010). The legislation also requires operators to take 
other measures to ensure safety, but in this context, only the safety management systems 
in accordance with the Seveso Directive (in Finland, Annex III by decree 59/1999) are 
examined. 
 
The mentioned safety management system is very similar to the other operating 
systems. The system differs from the others as it includes a well developed change 
management partition. This is the best practice in the branch according to the Finnish 
Safety Technology Authority (TUKES, 2009). Another best practice is the clear 
structure of the system. It consists of six basic elements (Figure 3.1), the “blue area”; 
identification and evaluation of the hazards, operational control, management of change 
and planning for emergencies constitute the core of the system. 
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Figure 3.1 The safety management system in accordance with the Seveso Directive. 
 
3.2.4  Railway industry 
 
A safety management system is a general requirement in the railway industry. The 
requirements are set in the Railway Safety Directive (2004). The system is very similar 
to ones used by other industries. A few best practices of the branch are still worth 
mentioning. 
The Safety Unit in the European Railway Agency (ERA) has done a lot of work to 
improve railway safety. They have developed Common Safety Targets (CSTs) 
(Commission Regulation 2009/352/EC) and Common Safety Methods (CSMs) 
(Commission Decision 2009/460/EC) to ensure that a high level of safety is maintained. 
To ensure that the safety targets are reached, Common Safety Indicators have also been 
developed. The indicators, which are tools for assessment of the safety level and the 
performance of the operators, have to be reported annually to the ERA by the safety 
authorities of the Member States. 
Another good example of the quality work of the ERA´s Safety Agency is the 
requirement for rail transport operators to keep a record of hazards in which all 
identified hazards shall be registered (Commission Decision 2009/460/EC). The record 
is: “the document in which identified hazards, their related measures, their origin and 
the reference to the organization which has to manage them are recorded and 
referenced”. The record makes it possible to track the progress of monitoring risks 
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3.2.5  Environment 
 
Today, also environmental protection can be controlled by a management systems (like 
ISO 14001) or other equivalent processes. Although environmental protection should in 
general, excluding the ISM Code, kept away from safety management (Environmental 
Authority in Finland, 2009), the environmental management systems have a lot of 
similar features with other management systems, and this is a point to consider here. On 
the other hand, as with the ISM Code in the shipping industry, environmental 
management has been similarly included in the general management system also in 
other branches. 
 
In Finland, all activities that may cause pollution need an environmental permit 
(Ministry of the Environment, 2010). When applying, the operator has to present the 
environmental authority with: 
 
 an assessment of the environmental impacts of the activities, 
 an assessment of the risks of the activities, proposed action to prevent accidents 
and actions to be taken in the event of  an accident, 
 an account of any environmental management systems, and 
 information on the supervision and monitoring of activities, the monitoring of 
discharges into the environment and their impacts, and measurement methods 
and equipment, methods of calculation and related quality assurance 
(Environmental Protection Decree 169/2000, Section 9). 
An operator is also required to make an environmental impact assessment (EIA) for the 
project of the certain size. This is to ensure that significant environmental impacts are 
adequately examined (Ministry of the Environment, 2010). If there are alterations in the 
project, the process is required to remake. EIA process is compared with a risk 
assessment procedure.  
 
3.2.6  Occupational health and safety 
 
It is a long tradition with the enhancement of occupational health and safety has a long 
history. Results of the work are visible on many workplaces. One good example of the 
results is the Finnish Zero Accidents Forum that is a voluntary network of Finnish 
workplaces that aims to improve occupational safety and strive towards zero accidents 
(Finnish Institute of Occupational Health, 2010). It has also put a great deal of work into 
the development of risk assessment and incident reporting tools in the field of 
occupational safety. The use of these tools has spread to many workplaces.  
 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration in Finland (2008) has made a 
guidebook of safety management. Although the guide’s emphasis is on occupational 
safety, there are many general basic rules of safety management introduced in the book. 
This is good, because on many branches where there is no statutory requirement for a 
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safety management system, actions to improve safety may be limited only to improving 
safety at work. 
 
3.3  Best safety management practices for shipping companies 
 
Below are listed some of the most remarkable safety management practices for the 
maritime sector. Several best practices have been found in this project but the following 
chapters do not include all of them. Much more practices are presented in the report of 
this study (“Best safety management practices for shipping companies and ports”). 
 
3.3.1  Hazard identification and risk management 
 
Hazard identification, risk assessment, and risk management are the core processes of 
the safety management system (ICAO, 2008). For some reason, all these are absent 
from the ISM Code. Or conversely, they are included, because the code has been written 
on such a general level that it is possible to include almost anything in the code. Also 
the previous formulation of the paragraph about safeguards against all identified risks 
includes the hypothesis that a risk analysis has been made. Still, this core has not been 
emphasized or highlighted sufficiently. This is visible on the maritime industry: safety 
management systems have been used for several years, but no risk assessments have yet 
been made by many companies. The systems are not based on risk management. 
 
The Maritime Safety Committee has adopted amendments to the ISM Code related to 
risk assessment. The amendments came to force 1 July, 2010 and now the “company 
should assess all identified risks to its ships, personnel, and the environment and 
establish appropriate safe guards” (Objectives, 1.2.2). Before the amendment, the text 
of the same paragraph was: “the company should establish safeguards against all 
identified risks”. The amendment is very important, however the whole idea of the 
safety management system is not stated clearly enough in the code. 
 
Good examples of best risk management practices are coming from the aviation and 
railway industries. ICAO’s Safety Management System is based completely on risk 
management and these are thoroughly described and explained in the organisation’s 
Safety Management Manual. The European Railway Agency has also made in-depth 
studies on the subject. Risk management assessment is a part of Commission Regulation 
352/2009 on the adoption of a common safety method on risk evaluation and 
assessment (Figure 3.2). 
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Figure 3.2 Risk management process and independent assessment (EC Reg. 352/2009) 
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3.3.2  Strategies of Safety Management 
 
The basic philosophy of safety management systems is continuous improvement. The 
whole system has to be monitored at all times and any deficiencies that need correction 
must be noted. There are many effective methods of acquiring relevant and real-time 
information about the system’s status. One of these is incident reporting. It has recently 
been a lot of attention in the Finnish maritime sector because there are many problems 
with the using of the method. In their study of maritime safety culture, Lappalainen & 
Salmi (2009) have found the need to enhance incident reporting.  
 
It is very important to have a functional incident reporting system is so important, as it 
is important to understand that all accidents and incidents tell us of something that has 
already happened. If safety improvement actions are based on events that have 
happened, the method is reactive. This kind of method of looking back to the past is not 
a sufficient method of improving safety (Hollnagel, 2008). It is very important to 
observe, what is expected further on and identify new potential hazards. In addition to 
the need to make predictions, it is also important to understand that companies and 
operations are not stable. They are always in small, but continuous movement (Reiman 
& Oedewald, 2008). The environment, society, regulations, automation, equipment, 
works, workers, etc. are changing. The phenomenon is called practical drift. For 
example, if after an accident investigation it has been noted that the accident could have 
been prevented with some working method, it is still possible that this proven method is 
not utilisable after one year due to the renewal of surrounding factors. It may also be 
that practices have been changed, because the workers have discovered a better way 
compared to what the instructions have originally prescribed. To take into account and 
predict this continuous change, reactive and predictive methods in safety management 




Figure 3.3 Safety Management levels according to ICAO (2008). 
Efficiency of the ISM Code in Finnish shipping companies      25 
3.3.3  Resources for safety ensuring 
 
Currently, according to ISM Code, there should be one designated person in a shipping 
company who is responsible for general safety (Designated Person, DP). Very often the 
DP is at the same time responsible for various other matters, like environmental 
protection and even technical subjects. The resources for safety management are 
insufficient. 
 
In the sector of air traffic, a flight company is required to set up a safety organization, 
which usually consists of several persons (Gröhn, 2009). ICAO recommends that a 
flight company sets up a Safety Services Office, that is: “independent and neutral from 
processes and decisions made regarding the delivery of services by line managers of 
operational units” (ICAO, 2009, SMS Manual, 8.5.6).The office is managed by an 
Accountable Executive, who is: “a single, identifiable person having final responsibility 
for the effective and efficient performance of the organization’s SMS” (ICAO, 2009, 
SMS Manual 8.4.5). The day-to-day management functions of the SMS in the Safety 
Services Office are the responsibility of the Safety Manager. In addition to these two 
persons there should be several others responsible for safety in the organisation, such as 
a Head of Operations and a Head of Maintenance. It should be noted that several 
persons are responsible for safety (and security) also in many other safety critical 
industries, such as railways, nuclear power plants along with many ports and port 
related companies. 
 
It would be a good practice to have at least two persons in a shipping company to ensure 
that safety is maintained at the sufficient level. The other person could for example help 
the DP to investigate the nonconformities, incidents and accidents, to develop the 
company’s safety management guidance for masters and other ship crew, to develop 
hazard identification, risk assessment and safety assurance – all the important matters 
that are currently under threat of not being dealt with due to lack of resources. 
  
3.3.4  The management of change 
 
Changing situations like the expansion, contraction, changes to existing systems, 
equipment, programmes, products and services, and the introduction of new equipment 
or procedures may inadvertently introduce hazards into the operation of a shipping 
company (or to organizations in port industry as well). It is important that the hazards 
that are caused by changing circumstances are systematically and proactively identified. 
This is an important element of the safety management system, but for some reason it is 
not included in the ISM Code. 
 
Safety reviews, which are utilised in many industries, are valuable sources of 
information and decision making under circumstances of change. One best practice to 
deal with change is first to conduct a safety review (a risk analysis) before the intended 
change. If the review indicates that the change is too risky, the choices are to try to 
eliminate the risks completely or to mitigate them to a manageable level. If this is not 
possible, the change cannot be executed. 
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3.3.5  Guidance material 
 
It has been noted in this project as well as in other studies (for example, Finnish 
Maritime Administration, 2007) that there is a lot of safety legislation in the maritime 
domain. In many mariner’s opinion, the amount of regulations is so high that it is 
difficult to manage. Several DPs and masters have said that it is difficult to know what 
is expected of them. Therefore, when trying to improve maritime safety, the way is not 
to increase the amount of legislation and rules, but to clarify what these rules include, 
what are the required safety levels, and how these levels should be reached, etc. 
Guidance material is needed. ICAO´s SMS Manual is an excellent example of this kind 
of a guide. 
 
3.4  Port safety 
 
For shipping companies, a safety management system is mandatory due to the ISM 
Code. For port operators, similar requirements have not been set. Still, many port 
operators want to manage safety matters by using some kind of a management system. 
One of the most popular system for this is the OHSAS – ISO 18 000, which is an 
international occupational health and safety management system assessment 
specification. In addition, many port related companies use the same system. Several 
port managers and port related companies use other management systems as well, like 
the ISO 9001 quality management system. 
 
The safety management level of ports and port related companies varies a lot with the 
size of the port and company in question. In the case of the smaller ports, we cannot 
even talk about safety management. For this reason, the focus of the study was on a few 
underlying reasons of the situation. One important notice was that among the port 
industry, all the safety and security matters are understood to contain three basic 
elements: occupational health and safety, environmental protection and security 
(especially ISPS related). If we look at what is included in the entire safety and security 
example from a corporation’s viewpoint, there are: production and operation safety and 
security, occupational safety, environmental safety, emergency and preparedness 
actions, information security, crime prevention, personnel safety and security, 
infrastructure safety and security, safety and security of foreign activity and safety and 
security of contractors and subcontractors (e.g., YTNK, 2005). If we examine the 
subject from a port’s viewpoint, ship safety, cargo securing, traffic safety (inside port 
area), chemical safety and railway safety can be included to the list. The 
abovementioned “three elements approach” to safety and security at ports is too narrow 
in the light of the other lists. Occupational health and safety focuses on individual 
employees, their working performance and working operations, and it is not enough if 
we are trying to prevent accidents and especially disasters or catastrophes. 
 
Another point worth noting is the effect from Finnish terminology. In Finnish, there is 
only, ´turvallisuus´, which means both safety and security. Commonly the word 
´turvallisuus´ is used to mean safety and simply ´turva´ meaning security (example in 
Finnish legislation). Still, in many contexts, the word ´turvallisuus´ is used to mean only 
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security matters. For example, there is general information about different subjects on 
the portal of Finnish Port Association (2007) (only in the Finnish website), where one 
title is ´satamaturvallisuus´. It should literally mean port safety and security, or 
according to the abovementioned general custom, only port safety. However, the 
content of the text only covers security matters, (ISPS code). When interviewing the 
port authorities and employees of the port related companies, this misunderstanding of 
the terms was evident. Although using the terms in this way is not simply wrong, it 
efficiently complicates work to improve safety. 
 
Legislation concerning port operations (especially port safety related legislation) has 
spread out to several laws and regulations. Moreover, the official supervision of port 
operations has branched to several ministries. No authority has a general view about 
port safety. Safety supervision tasks have been left to the port authorities themselves. 
Still, the role of the port authority is not clear at the moment. Some say that port 
authorities are no longer authorities (in Finland), after most of them became public 
utilities, but others claim they still are. According to a study by the Ministry of 
Transport and Communication (2004) on the development of port operations and the 
reformation of port legislation, Finnish port authorities have both government and 
commercial tasks. All the same, the culture of action is disappearing. Ports are changing 
from municipal institutions, to public utilities and further to limited companies. The 
trend is more and more commercial, and safety supervision fits this trend poorly. Could 
port authorities perform their government task while they are working for the 
commercial corporation? 
 
Considering the mentioned change, there is a need for legislation regeneration. 
Therefore a working group was set up to prepare this reform. Their investigation is 
expected to be completed in autumn 2010. According to some experts, it is impending 
that the two present port related laws will only be reversed and instead of it any new law 
will not be enacted. Whatever will be concluded in this legislative reform, it would be 
important also by legislation to clarify and determine the roles, responsibilities, 
obligations, and tasks of safety supervision at ports that are currently unclear. 
 
3.5  Summary 
 
In this study we have been investigating for the best safety management practices for 
mariners and port operators. There are no requirements for safety management systems 
for port operators and this is why the level of safety management varies greatly from 
one port to another. In this sense, the objects of this study were not reasoned. Instead of 
to trying to collect the best practices, it was actually more important to chart the 
condition of port safety and study the backgrounds. The roles, responsibilities, rights 
and tasks in port safety should be determined unambiguously. It is also recommended, 
that a model of safety management system for port authorities is established. 
Recommendations for mariners are related to risk and change management, strategies of 
safety management and resources for ensuring safety. Maritime authorities are expected 
to produce more guidance material for safety management. Safety management 
practices are developed on many domains. The safety culture is very advanced in some 
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industries, like aviation and nuclear power. There are plenty of lessons to be learned 
from these cultures! 
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4  MARITIME SAFETY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS  
 
 
Risto Jalonen & Pentti Kujala, Aalto University 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
The purpose of this study was to find out methods that are used for safety assessment 
and “measurements” in maritime safety management with special interest in key figures. 
This research, which included a review on the use of such safety indicators in other 
industries as well, was divided into four main phases: 
• Safety measuring methods in maritime and other industry branches, (Jalonen & Salmi, 
2009), 
• Accident analysis concerning the effects of the International Safety Management 
Code (= ISM Code) on accidents of Finnish vessels and foreign vessels in Finnish 
coastal waters, (Kiuru & Salmi, 2009),  
• An interview study related to the impacts of ISM Code on Finnish shipping 
companies (Lappalainen & Salmi, 2009),  
• Statistical analysis, analyses of data of incidents, accidents, near-accidents, and 
violations acquired from the administration and from private companies, (Salmi, 
2010) 
 
A review (Sariola, 2010) that makes a survey of the liabilities for the vessel source 
pollution on the Gulf of Finland was considered important in this context, too. In this 
review (Sariola, 2010) the administration’s opportunities (and available tools) for 
making interventions e.g. in oil pollution or other violation cases are also clarified. 
 
4.2  Safety performance indicators 
 
Accident statistics can be considered as evidence of the state of (or actually of the lack 
of) safety performance. They have been used for long e.g. by administrations to monitor 
the status of maritime safety and possible changes on the safety. This traditional 
approach of evaluating safety afterwards by the number of past accidents or incidents is 
practical and easily understood. However, it is a lagging indicator and it includes some 
deficiencies. It does not give any indication of the safety performance in the future, 
neither does it give much support to efforts to improve safety in an efficient way, unless 
the statistics are connected to proper accident investigation, analysis of accident causes 
and consequences, risk analysis and cost-benefit analysis.  
 
If the safety status is characterized only by a high rate of accidents, a rising or 
diminishing trend in the accident or incident (= near accident) frequency may be 
understood as an indicator of a change. However, the less accidents or incidents there 
are the more pronounced natural deviations from a general trend will probably be and 
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the more difficult it will be to utilise accident statistics as a tool for safety management. 
The risk may not be zero even after ten years without accidents. Thus, additional tools 
and more detailed, different measures of safety (or risk) for efficient safety management 
are required. 
 
The literature review (Jalonen & Salmi, 2009) was concentrated in the use of statistical, 
safety-related data and indicators in maritime safety management as well as in some 
other industries.. The importance of safety performance indicators in safety 
management has been emphasized in other industries, in chemical and nuclear industry, 
as well as within other modes of transportation. Safety indicators, especially the leading 
and lagging safety performance indicators, have recently been in the focus of debate and 
discussion in the context of process industry, see e.g. (Hopkins, 2009a) and (Hopkins, 
2009b). That debate related to different concepts, terminology, scientific theories and 
practice made it apparent that the applications of this approach still needs to be under 
investigation (Sgorou, 2010), so it is no wonder that even the (actual) rates and statistics 
of near misses may sometimes be considered to belong to the group of lagging 
indicators. However, this debate (Hopkins, 2009b) clearly demonstrated that the leading 
indicators are a topical issue in safety management. 
 
Irrespective of the difficulties and debates concerning the terminology and concepts 
related to leading and lagging safety performance indicators, it is clear that more 
emphasis should be placed on methods that can be used for accident prevention. 
Therefore, the use of leading safety indicators for monitoring and controlling the status 
of safety performance and its changes is rational. Various descriptions and 
recommendations on their use have been published, for instance see the reference lists 
in (Jalonen & Salmi, 2009; Khan et al., 2010). It is believed that leading indicators can 
also be developed for the use of the maritime sector with reasonable efforts.  
 
General factors affecting safety and various indicators that are already in use or under 
development were studied within all four transportation branches (aviation, sea, rail and 
road), the offshore industry and other industries, e.g., the process industry. The 
following issues were brought into focus in the literature review (Jalonen & Salmi, 
2009):    
• the “free flow of information” is one fundamental factor enabling proactive risk 
reduction 
• a “blame free” reporting culture is important to ensure a flow of reliable information 
• leading safety performance indicators that form an early warning system, i.e. a 
proactive safety management system, should be used/taken into use by the maritime 
administration, and by shipping companies, in addition to the already used lagging 
indicators (e.g., accident statistics)  
• feasible sets of additional safety performance indicators should be 
developed/selected/used by all actors in the system on its various levels (and sectors) 
to facilitate comprehensive safety assessments in the continuous process of safety 
management. 
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The “free flow of information” means that various decision-makers on various levels of 
the system, having different capabilities in relation to their knowledge, numerous 
practical abilities and economical possibilities will have access to all real data and 
information in the system that is necessary for their decisions and/or actions. Correct 
decisions concerning a system can hardly be made without sufficient data and reliable 
information. A “blame free” reporting culture is one prerequisite for reliable reports. If 
reports are written (or not written at all) in the fear of a punishment, some distortion e.g. 
in the incident reports is always possible. If the accident and incident reports are not 
reliable, the effects of the distortion extend to the statistics and possibly even to other 
documents. Distorted information will increase the risk of bad or less efficient 
decisions. Therefore, there is a strong need for good quality accident investigation 
reports. 
 
4.3  Accident analysis  
 
A combination of accident investigation and the use of the analysis and synthesis of 
accident reports to give support to organisational learning may be among the best ways 
to achieve better results in accident prevention. The accident analysis carried out in this 
study (Kiuru & Salmi, 2009) was based on over 90 recent accident reports published by 
the Accident Investigation Board of Finland (AIBF). In this study Kiuru & Salmi (2009) 
ended up with the following conclusions: 
• accident analysis and statistics can be used as indicators for risk, but quantitative 
results should go through qualitative validation before use. 
• the overall accident risk in Finnish shipping and on Finnish coastal waters in general 
has decreased within the ISM-period. 
• the average severity of accidents is increasing.  
 
The shift towards more severe accidents identified in this report was explained at least 
partly by the general development of risk management towards being targeted more on 
occupational safety within the industry. This was assumed to have lead to a 
considerable reduction of minor accidents. While occupational safety has taken great 
leaps towards a safe working environment, the safety development in vessel traffic 
safety has been slow. 
 
In the accident analysis (Kiuru & Salmi, 2009) it was further suggested that:  
• a significant part of marine accidents is predictable.  
 
This can be explained by the following reasoning: due to malfunctioning safety 
management many vessels sail with obvious and present risk factors, while taking 
conscious risks in their daily traffic and in the worst case trying to hide these obvious 
endangering elements (Kiuru & Salmi, 2009).  
• most of the positive impact brought by the ISM Code is focused on deficiencies 
connected to the ISM or to human factors. However, deficiencies related to these 
matters are also factors that still cause most accident risks.  
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This means that the direction of the current development in international maritime 
legislation and administration is good and successfully targeted, but there is still much 
development work to be done within this field. Maintaining this positive development is 
closely connected to the successful implementation of the new safety culture. 
• the rapid development of technology has surely improved safety, but at the same time 
this has developed new threats concerning the complexity of equipment. These threats 
should be taken into account when plans for new ships and their maintenance are 
made and also considered in the planning of maritime education. 
 
4.4  Interview study 
 
The interview study, reported in (Lappalainen & Salmi, 2009), and partly reviewed in 
Chapter 2, was carried out with  target groups consisting of seafarers, companies and 
other organisations representing the major sectors of Finnish maritime industry. The 
following main conclusions could be made based on this study (Lappalainen & Salmi, 
2009): 
• attitudes towards safety have improved both on management level and among 
seafarers during the past 15 years.  
 
The positive change in attitudes can be seen in the management’s support, safety 
equipment and moral, for safety and security issues. Seafarers reveal their changed 
attitudes by following and complying with safety measures, rules and regulation most of 
the time. Both the management and the personnel feel that safety is a part of their day to 
day work. 
• the influence of the ISM Code was considered mainly positive, but the growing 
bureaucracy was pointed as a major defect.  
 
Major benefits of the ISM were perceived to be, the better organisation of operations, 
clarified roles and responsibilities of maritime personnel, and the systematic approach 
to safety management, which lead to helping personnel to assimilate instructions and 
safe working methods. Seafarers also considered that the coming of the ISM Code 
forced companies to participate and to take responsibilities concerning safety. 
• the interviews highlighted the following major lack in the current situation of safety 
development: The gathering of safety information concerning near-accidents, 
incidents and violations is still suffering from the reluctance of seafarers to report their 
own mistakes.  
 
This missing information is hindering efforts that could be made to prevent future 
incidents and accidents. Some reasons for this trouble causing behaviour are: the old 
blame culture still exists at least in the seafarers minds; clear reporting limits are not 
established; seafarers do not understand, or in other words, are not correctly explained 
the importance of this information (Lappalainen & Salmi, 2009). Thus, a crucial 
element of organisational learning, incident reports that could facilitate learning from 
the mistakes and success stories of others within the own organisation and an even 
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wider scale, seems to be rather poorly developed in the Finnish system. However, the 
old method of the development of traditional seamanship with long careers and gradual 
promotions naturally includes unofficial methods to disseminate practical seamanship to 
the younger ones without any formal reports. 
 
Based on the findings (Lappalainen & Salmi, 2009), the under-reporting of maritime 
incidents seems to be evident. However, the avoidance of superfluous paperwork may 
be a characteristic of many experienced mariners without being an undisputed proof of a 
lack of good seamanship skills (Knudsen, 2009; Antonsen, 2009). Therefore, the 
development of a fully working incident reporting system is a big challenge for the 
safety management in the context of seafaring. 
 
4.5  Statistical analysis 
 
The statistical analysis, see (Salmi, 2010), was based mainly on three data sources: a) 
incident reports registered by the Finnish VTS-centre between the 1st of November 
2002 and August 2009, b) HELCOM accident statistics in the period 2002  2008 and 
c) Paris MOU PSC data. The VTS-reports were scrutinized and by focusing on the 
vessels in these incident reports were compared to those in HELCOM accident 
statistics. Thus, the following conclusions could be made: 
• comparison of the VTS-reports and accident statistics already proves that the general 
targeting of the VTS-reporting is efficient and that it can be used as it is for 
identifying accident prone vessels 
• these accident prone vessels often reappear both in the accident statistics and VTS-
reported contraventions, which leads to the conclusion that the comprehension of 
safety risks and risk management are insufficient. Thus the development of safety 
culture has been inadequate.  
• the number of non-reporting vessels decreased approximately by one third each year 
in the period 2004 – 2008, and in the same time period the precision of the applied 
approach of using VTS reports to target accident prone ships raised by two thirds.  
These findings are congruent with previous conclusions, see (Kiuru & Salmi, 2009), 
that the overall accident probability in Finnish shipping and coastal waters has 
decreased during the late ISM period.  
• the influence of safety culture to accident susceptibility is obvious. This conclusion is 
supported by the reported scrutiny of VTS (with accident data).  
• the decreasing proportions of reports of the so-called “Zombie” vessels (vessels that 
do not fulfil their reporting obligations and/or do not give response via standard 
communication channels) and of the accidents of “Zombie” reported vessels can be 
seen as direct influence of a general trend of improving safety culture onboard.  
 
Further findings in (Salmi, 2010) included the following: 
• relative portions of different vessel types in VTS reporting have remained 
approximately at the same level during the observed period of time (2004 – 2008).  
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• the of number of tanker accidents seemed to be decreasing. This could be due to 
reinforcing self regulation of safety matters in the oil and gas industry.  
 
However, especially with tankers, it is probably impossible to distinguish the effects of 
ISM from the effects of the safety conscious customers’ requirements. Vessels of 
certain type and age flying under certain flags can be considered more accident prone 
than others, but Salmi (2010) continued the categorizing even further by comparing 
companies behind these vessels and ended up to the following conclusion: 
• all companies indicated behind VTS reported vessels in 2007 were of European 
origin. Thus, with the administration’s common goal of a safe Baltic Sea, they could 
all be forced to change their company policies towards a safer direction by national 
laws and regulations, without the need for IMO acceptance. 
 
VTS reported vessels (in 2004 – 2008) with accidents in HELCOM statistics after the 
VTS-reporting were also cross-examined with Paris MOU PSC data by Salmi (2010). 
The following result was obtained:  
• by targeting vessels with 3 to 4 true deficiencies (see below) approximately half of the 
accident prone vessels could be pre-identified. When vessels with fewer deficiencies, 
but with deficiencies concerning charts and route planning will be added to this group, 
most of the future accident vessels can be pre-identified. 
 
Most significant deficiencies that could be used for targeting accident-prone vessels by 
reflecting safety cultural aspects presented in former reports (Kiuru & Salmi, 2009; 
Lappalainen & Salmi, 2009) were considered in (Salmi, 2010) to be as follows: 
 
1. ISM related deficiencies 
2. Missing charts and nautical publications 
3. Missing/nonconformity of passage plan 
4. Missing/technical problems of navigational aids and communication equipment 
(radar, radio etc.) 
 
The effort made by Paris MOU countries by using PSC (Paris MOU, 2009a and b), is 
huge and surely has a positive effect on diminishing accidents in maritime traffic. 
However, by reading the reports of PSC, it can also be noted that: 
• missing charts, nautical publications and navigational aids do not seem to be a 
sufficient reason for detention 
and 
• vessels with constant list of over 10 PSC deficiencies are sailing years without 
detentions or banning 
 
The cross-examination of the VTS reports, HELCOM accident statistics, Port State 
Control reports and AIS data of traffic flows resulted in the conclusion that the direct 
use of VTS reports as indicators to target accident prone vessels with adequate precision 
seems to work well. The risk of accident for these vessels is one and a half to two times 
higher than the risk for an average vessel sailing on the Gulf of Finland. It was also 
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noted in (Salmi, 2010) that the average accident probability on the Baltic Sea is rather 
high, 1 to 2%, which leads to the conclusion that the difference between safe vessels 
and average vessels is significant.  
 
4.6  Liabilities of the vessel and administrative tools  
 
Maritime safety, sea rescue and prevention of marine pollution are directed by 
legislation, international treaties, orders and directions. The coastal states along the Gulf 
of Finland, Estonia, Finland and Russia, are fundamental actors when the development 
and the efficiency of the executive actions and their control based on the administrative 
tools are considered. All also have many interests on safety and environment issues. 
Therefore, a review on the current administrative tools and on the liabilities for the 
vessel was considered necessary. This sub-chapter presents a summary of the review 
(Sariola, 2010), which was carried out within the WP1-framework of METKU-project. 
 
UNCLOS, MARPOL 73/78 and the Helsinki Convention are the most important treaties 
relating to the sea environment and pollution internationally. Additionally, there are also 
several other international conventions and treaties, EU Directives and national 
legislation, brought into force by acts and decrees in Finland. The most recent EU 
Directives are included in the Erika III- package approved by the European council in 
March 2009.   
 
In addition to conventions and legislation, the national rescue organisation, shipping 
company culture and the activeness of the captain are in an important role when it 
comes to oil prevention and accident management. The courses of action of the states 
and shipping companies have an important role.  
 
The activeness of the shipping companies reflects to the classifications, insurances, as 
well as to accident announcements and management.  The captain is responsible for the 
whole vessel and the crew and therefore has an influence on the activities on board. In 
addition to the instructions given by the shipping company and following the agreed 
course of action, the captain’s duty is to act in the best possible manner to prevent the 
vessel or cargo from damaging the environment. One important preventive action is a 
duly made announcement of the accident.  
 
The vessels and the shipping companies operating continuously on the Gulf of Finland 
often have a more ambitious course of action than the legislation and treaties require. 
Their less ambitious competitors are also aware of the circumstances on the Gulf of 
Finland. Therefore it is essential to pay attention to the control and management of the 
vessels that have a lower safety level and the shipping companies and classification 
societies, which are responsible for these vessels. Otherwise, the risk of violations and 
e.g. loss of environmental safety will increase. The supervision can be carried out by the 
flag state, the coastal state and the port state. The flag state, coastal state and port state 
have an essential role in the prevention and solving of the accidents. The flag state has a 
right to intervene at high sea, the port state has a right to control traffic and ship safety, 
and the coastal state has a right to intervene in outrageous pollutions.  
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The prevention of pollution in connection to marine rescue is demanding action.  It is 
directed by national legislation and internationally accepted guidelines relating to 
marine rescue. The vessel-source oil damage prevention is managed by e.g. the Finnish 
Border Guard, rescue services, SYKE and AVI. The Finnish Border Guard is 
responsible for accident management and rescue.  
 
The Gulf of Finland area cooperation plan that was completed on the year 2007 is 
followed by a new plan: a cooperation plan for the vessel-source oil and chemical 
pollution prevention on the Gulf of Finland. The regional rescue services are 
responsible for the management of the accidents on the territorial waters. If the accident 
occurs on the EEZ or at the high seas, SYKE is responsible for the management. In 
spite of the instructions, the division of responsibilities is not clear between the rescue 
services and SYKE. In practice, operation management is agreed upon when they are 
aware of the location, weather conditions and environmental aspects.  
 
The safety of the marine traffic and the oil prevention on the Gulf of Finland are 
important when developing the future actions.  International cooperation between the 
states on the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Sea and continuous cooperation between 
shipping companies are essential. Oil prevention on the Gulf of Finland is managed 
mainly by Finland. Despite of the long term cooperation between Estonia and Russia, 
the administrative, legislative and cultural differences are complicating the practical 
work. Therefore, it is important to pay attention to the cooperation between all involved 
parties, including the shipping companies. It is important to concentrate on improving 
the possibilities for successful cooperative action because of the increasing risk of 
serious oil damage on the Gulf of Finland. 
 
4.7  Recommendations 
 
Based on the presented findings it is recommended that Baltic Sea states cooperatively 
start to build VTS reporting systems that will cover the whole Baltic Sea. Corrective 
actions need to be chosen in good cooperation between the maritime administrations of 
all Baltic states. Actions are still required to eliminate or decrease the risk caused by 
non-safe vessels. These actions are recommended to be both supportive and restrictive, 
but they need to be effective enough to facilitate continuous improvement in maritime 
safety.  
 
This study has demonstrated that accident prone shipping companies can be identified 
by the simultaneous use of PSC and VTS reports. We believe that with this approach, 
the maritime administrations can focus their efforts on the most accident prone ships, 
either by simultaneously enforcing and supporting them and the companies behind them 
to truly follow the obligations set in the ISM Code, or by removing them from traffic 
where risky behaviour cannot be accepted.  
 
If this recommendation can be accepted, and it proves effective (as expected), the main 
emphasis can be shifted towards self-regulation and more supportive actions in the 
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future. The administration should seek for the best practices on giving support to the 
continuous process of safety assessments and improvements in safety management 
within their administrative territory. The development of safety management and safety 
culture should enhance incident reporting, which will further facilitate the improvement 
of safety at sea. 
 
4.8  Future actions 
 
While accident prone companies can be identified and information indicating missing 
safety culture can be recognized, this report still stayed on a rather general level by 
describing the effects of safety culture on safety. Thus it would be important to further 
use more precisely targeted information and by studying the influence of cultural factors 
onboard the accident prone vessels, learn to recognise and to model safety culture so 
that it could be implemented in future probabilistic accident/traffic models.  
 
One important challenge is to find a well-reasoned model for allocating resources in a 
suitable way. Validated accident models, FSA, risk assessments and cost-benefit 
analyses can be used for this purpose. After hazard identification and risk modelling, a 
suitable system of risk-based safety indicators could be generated for the administration 
and also e.g. for separate shipping companies. Therefore, it is recommended that the 
next steps in the continuous improvement will include further studies related to the 
maritime risk models that could serve the needs of safety management on its various 
levels.  
 
“Prevention is better than cure” is a widely accepted idiom. However, the recent 
offshore oil spill catastrophe in the Gulf of Mexico has reminded us of the fact that a 
holistic view on safety is needed. When prevention fails, preparedness, even to the 
worst case scenarios, is important. Therefore, it is also essential, that the new systems of 
safety performance indicators will cover all relevant areas within the unique and 
challenging scope of maritime safety. 
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5  INFLUENCE OF TOP MANAGEMENT ON SAFETY CULTURE 
 
 
Pekka Räisänen, Turku University of Applied Sciences 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
The role of the company’s top management in the implementation of safety culture 
and best safety practices in the Finnish shipping industry were studied by the Ship 
Laboratory at Turku University of Applied Sciences. The research consisted of three 
parts: literature survey (Räisänen, 2009), interviews and interactions on key risks as 
experienced by the top management, and further actions on a key risk, the 
occupational safety. 
 
The research for finding the key risks was carried out through interviews and 
interactions with a sample of top managers of Finnish and Åland shipping 
companies during 2009 and 2010. During the interactions to study the key risks, 
interviews were conducted, suggestions of improvement were made and possibilities 
of cooperation and benchmarking within the industry were studied by the researcher. 
The interviewees were selected mainly from ten volunteering companies within the 
Finnish Shipowners' Association. Twenty-seven persons participated in the 
interactions. They held positions in general management, operations, technical 
management and human resources of ten shipping companies; ESL Shipping, 
Finnlines, Langh Ship, Neste Oil, Prima Shipping, Rederi AB Eckerö, Rettig Group 
Ltd Bore, Tallink Silja, VG-Shipping, and Viking Line. Of these, eight were at the 
highest position of responsibility concerning shipping in their respective 
organizations.  
 
Of the key risks found during the interactions, benchmarking and the sharing of 
information were found to be easiest in occupational safety. An analysis was carried 
out to find the safety level of the participants. The study covered 1145 work 
accidents onboard during the years 2005 – 2009 totalling 24 million work hours on 
55 vessels. The number of work accidents was compared to information from 
international shipping and oil business, as well as to some general data published by 
the Finnish Federation of Accident Insurance Institutions (FAII). 
 
5.2  Literature survey on the influence of top management on safety culture 
 
As a background for the interaction with the shipowners, a literature survey on 
safety culture (Räisänen, 2009) was carried out. We found out that questionnaire 
surveys and case studies are commonly used methods. They can help to discover 
risk behaviour of persons in an organization, which are often enabled or augmented 
by latent conditions in the workplace (Reason, 1997). The latent conditions can be 
physical or organizational, and are affected by the actions of the top management. In 
addition to directly contributing to the motivation of the workforce, the top 
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management has budgetary power over the safety expenditures e.g., the 
implementation and development of safety management systems.  The top 
management is also important factor affecting the risk-taking of employees as it both 
creates and controls the environment in which accidents occur (Molenaar et al., 
2002) but also influences employee safety attitudes, which correlate strongly with 
safety behaviour (Håvold, 2005). Similarly, the interest and commitment of the 
management increases the involvement of the employees, and thus contributes to the 
improvement of safety conditions.  
 
Assessment of safety culture is needed to establish the safety level that enables 
benchmarking for predicting the outcome of proposed safety interventions and for 
the follow-up of improvements. The assessment concerns the social behaviour of 
organisational members in the process of maintaining safety, which is not easy to 
measure. One obvious type of evidence that can be used to measure safety,  are the 
accidents and incidents, but unfortunately this method does not come without 
problems. The number of accidents may be too low for statistical reliability, and 
smaller incidents and near misses are difficult to recognise (Håvold, 2000), or may 
be a result of incentives (Fernández-Muñiz et al., 2007) such as bonuses for a good 
safety record, which leads to non-reporting (Håvold, 2000), or an accident-free 
period of time may suppress the eagerness for reporting. Small incidents may remain 
unreported, if negative consequences threaten the reporter. Accident rates increase if 
reporting is improved, which leads to false conclusions about deteriorating safety 
conditions. Therefore, a broader spectrum of factors and tools may be needed for the 
assessment of the safety culture in shipping. Some were found from literature and 
summarized in the interim report (Räisänen, 2009). 
 
5.3  Key risk categories and development areas 
 
The views of top managers of Finnish shipping companies on risks of their industry 
are important, as they help to focus research efforts. On the basis of the interactions 
of this research, eight key risk categories were formed: general management; human 
resources; seamanship and navigation; fire and technology risks; special risks of 
passenger vessels; systematic maintenance; securing of cargo; and occupational 
safety onboard. 
 
5.3.1  General management 
 
In the interviews with the top managers, the effects of company ownership and 
shareholders' interests to operations of the top management were inquired. The 
reported effects on safety work were very variable, depending on the background of 
the owners and their style of working with the operational management. Many top 
managers reported a neutral attitude for safety, rendering it as an "operational issue" 
that is not relevant for investors. However, in cases where investors were reported to 
affect the work of operational management, it was found that the owners can have a 
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significant positive or negative effect on safety e.g., attitudes towards safety in a 
shipping company or safety investments. 
 
Risks in profitability and the fact that many issues are decided outside the company 
limit the possibilities of the management to develop operations. Especially 
uncompetitive manning costs, flag state regulations that make flying foreign flags 
beneficial, changes in tax-free sales and environmental issues were mentioned 
during the interactions. 
 
Safety reviews are compulsory onboard but currently their style and number vary 
with flag administration. Therefore, when the interviewees were asked about the 
effects of the ISM Code (International Safety Management Code, i.e. International 
Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention by 
the International Maritime Organization) and the operation of flag states, many of 
them mentioned the need for harmonization of interpretations between flags and port 
states, so that only one interpretation would be used by all, saving the cost of 
multiple visits for all parties.  This would also save the resources of the flag and port 
states.  
 
5.3.2  Human resources 
 
In all interviews, the views of the top managers of the companies involved in the 
research were clear about the importance of human resources and their risk 
management. Human resources affect the economical risk, and manning costs 
determine the profitability in many company’s operation.  
 
The managers were acutely aware of the risks related to recruiting. In Finland, 
acquiring suitable deck and machinery personnel were recognized as a future risk, as 
the current personnel are near their retirement age. The managers also emphasized 
the need for managing the risks that are due to language and cultural differences 
between different nationalities onboard. Further, the large workload of some key 
persons onboard, such as chief mates, was recognized as risk in some companies. 
 
5.3.3  Seamanship and navigation 
 
The interviewed managers of the shipping companies were very well aware of 
possible risks in seamanship and navigation, and the importance of their risk 
management was never questioned. In many fields of seamanship and navigation 
forms of collaboration between competitors and the authorities were apparent, e.g. 
joint emergency exercises. Some comments were recorded on the past work of 
Finnish Maritime Administration (currently Finnish Transport Safety Agency, 
Maritime Sector) in safety issues. In general the comments were positive, but wishes 
for increased capacity in proactive and advisory services were recorded.  
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5.3.4  Fire and technology risks 
 
Fire risk was well known to the interviewees. Machine room fires and fires of non-
marine equipment, such as blowers, coffee-machines, computers and copying 
machines were mentioned. For ferries, the electric equipment in old cars can cause 
problems, especially in the summertime, when the traffic of "summer-cars" is at its 
busiest. The management of these risks is obviously necessary, and are dealt with a 
systematic approach in some companies.  
 
5.3.5  Special risks of passenger vessels 
 
Special risks that apply mostly to passenger vessels were mentioned in the 
interviews. Risks of bad publicity can affect the revenue of the company, but also 
the industry as a whole for instance, the effect of major incidents to the volume of 
passenger traffic. Another risk that was specifically mentioned was the risk of 
security procedures onboard passenger vessels, choosing suitable methods that 
depend on the client and his/her actions. 
 
5.4  Systematic maintenance 
 
Systematic maintenance was one of the three key development areas that the 
interviewees found most important. The interviewees with technical and 
navigational background had rather similar views on which systems are the most 
critical onboard. Particularly the main engine, the auxiliary engines, the bow 
thrusters, the steam production equipment (with heavy fuel oil), the searchlights, the 
electronic charts, the automation systems, the navigational systems, the rudder, the 
steering systems, and the stern tube (maintenance and protection) were mentioned. 
Depending on the arrangement and duplicity of vessel systems, any of these can 
cause serious consequences. Likewise, effort is needed for the training of operators.  
For some smaller operators, the benefits of database systems may not be as obvious 
as for the larger ones, as fully manual systems are also used for systematic 
maintenance. 
 
Preventive maintenance and intelligent diagnostics were considered by many of the 
interviewees to offer possibilities for the future. High manning costs onboard, 
complex systems, and less experienced recruits may steer the development towards 
the remote sensing of systems from ashore, which calls for new arrangements in the 
maintenance in shipping. In addition, the increased amount of electronics has 
lowered the ability of crews to solve problems onboard. Using remote sensing in 
maintenance could be a topic for further research. Moreover, research in the 
interference effects of electronics and electricity generation would be useful. 
Considering cargo, there are also problems to be solved in the transport of scrap 
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metal, which tends to cause damages to the cargo area, as well as in training the 
crews in the use of computers. 
 
5.5  Securing of cargo 
 
Lateral shifts in cargo can cause large listing angles, and the second safety 
development area that came up during the interviews concerned the securing of 
cargo, especially in ro-ro- and box transport. The crew cannot normally influence 
the securing of cargo inside containers and trailers, and the securing ashore may be 
carried out by persons who have no experience of the demands of sea transportation. 
The trailers can be entered only if there is reason for concern: e.g. something is 
sticking out, the suspension is fully down or leaks are present. Moreover, the 
lashings by the crew may be insufficient, or the large forces while travelling the 
seaway may present problems. Current ten-ton lashings are more difficult to draw to 
full tension manually than the older six-ton cargo lashings, which may actually 
lower the safety because after a while the sailors may tension them less than before. 
For bulk transport, varying internal friction of the cargo, due to e.g. specification or 
water content may present challenges.  
 
Development ideas were based on improving the availability of information in the 
cargo delivery chain. The first step for container and trailer traffic could be a simple 
information poster of marine cargo stowage for land-based people who do not know 
the requirements at sea. This might be a simple poster with striking photographs of 
trailers heeled and listed so that their sideways component of gravity of acceleration 
equals to the specified lashing loads. Further refinement with simple container 
loading manuals could be managed similarly to the bulk cargoes, where a simple 
manual of the most common cargoes for the ship is used with further references in 
the Internet. 
 
5.6  Occupational safety onboard 
 
The third safety development area that emerged during the interviews concerns the 
occupational safety onboard. Lethal injuries are not unknown in the industry as a 
whole. Typical causes are drowning, falling from height, and projectiles from 
breaking equipment. Breaking ropes, cold water and sudden shifting of cargo pose 
additional hazards. Also non-lethal injuries from various sources e.g. from working 
with machinery (e.g. lathe), ropes or jamming of body extremities are common. For 
passenger vessels, risks in galleys are particular. 
 
In addition to personnel injury and the associated grief, the companies suffer of the 
direct and secondary costs of accidents. One special consequence of safety problems 
in the maritime industry is also the difficulties in recruiting the best personnel, few 
top recruits will want to work in a company with a questionable safety record. In 
many interviews the level of occupational safety in the industry was assumed to 
have a direct relationship with general marine safety. This is an interesting 
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assumption that merits further research as occupational incidents are well 
documented by the Finnish shipowners and the authorities. 
 
5.7  Results of the benchmarking study of occupational safety 
 
Significant development possibilities were found in the benchmarking study of 
occupational safety statistics. Currently, statistics are being collected by the 
insurance companies and authorities, which communicate them to the ship operators. 
Common benchmarking standards have so far been rather limited. Consequently, 
prominent topics of safety culture development were found in metrics and sharing 
experiences: occupational safety statistics, such as Lost Time Incident Frequency, 
and sharing lessons learned from accidents. The development in the future should 
make use of the knowledge on models of safety culture in the chemical, oil and gas 
industries. While strictly keeping the application in practice and the limitations in 
budgets in mind. As a result, a confidential exchange and analysis of occupational 
safety incidents between shipowners was started. In the light of the experiences from 
other industries this should provide significant improvement, not only in 
occupational safety, but also in general maritime safety. 
 
There were two types of results: 1) general results of all work accidents onboard and 
2) results that relate the work category and respective working hours to each other. 
From the general results, the level of the Finnish shipping industry can be compared 
to other industries and foreign shipping as some comparable information is 
available. The results in work categories can be used e.g. to find the most accident- 
prone tasks on board. The results shown in the two following graphs relate to the 
whole of the data. In addition, further comparisons between workgroups and 
companies were carried out, which produced a set of 50 comparative graphs. We 
found that for passenger traffic, useful information could be obtained for 11 work 
categories onboard. For cargo vessels, four work categories were found to be 
sufficient (Table 5.1).  
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When the general results of the industry (1) are compared to the published statistics 
of oil industries or a tanker company, it can be noted that there seem to be good 
possibilities for safety development. It can also be noted that the official statistics of 
work accidents in waterborne traffic can give a too optimistic picture of safety 
onboard, as the office workforce is included in the statistics.  
 




We found significant differences between the companies when accidents in different work 
categories were compared. For deck/engine officers and deck/engine personnel the 
accident rate in the varied so that the most advanced companies had half of number 
of accidents compared with the least advanced. For galley personnel, the differences 
were even larger. It should be noted, however, that the number of accidents and the 
Table 5.1 Work categories used in the analysis
Passenger vessels Cargo vessels
Cabin attendants  Deck and engine personnel  
Cruise and program hosts  Deck/engine officers  
Deck and engine personnel  Galley personnel  
Deck/engine officers  Other
Engine repairmen  
Galley personnel  
Security personnel  











































Work accidents on all ships
Free time accidents on all ships
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statistics, includes offices etc.)
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hours in some work categories were rather low for proper statistical significance. For 
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Deck and engine personnel all ships
Galley personnel all ships
Most / Least accidents of all 
companies
Figure 5.2 Accidents per work category per million working hours, all vessels 2005–2009. 
 
5.8  Summary 
 
The view that safety culture is a dominant factor in the safe operation of complex 
technological systems has been accepted after the Chernobyl incident. The factors 
which influence the safety culture can be distilled from organisational studies, which 
often are questionnaire surveys. Information is also gained from working safety 
professionals who typically use case reviews. Typical recurring factors in surveys 
have been positive attitudes toward safety, management commitment, supervisor 
competence, and the priority of safety over production. Of these, management 
commitment has been studied in more detail, as the organization’s perception of its 
safety culture is crucial, and the management creates it through visions, values, 
measurement, rewarding and daily decisions. An assessment of safety culture is 
needed to establish a safety level for benchmarking, for predicting the outcome of 
proposed safety interventions and for the follow-up of improvements.  
 
There are good possibilities for improving safety among the Finnish ship operators. 
During the interactions with the ten volunteering companies, the attitudes in the 
industry were found to be very positive towards the development of risk 
management. Eight key risk categories were identified. These were: general 
management; human resources; seamanship and navigation; fire and technology 
risks; special risks of passenger vessels; systematic maintenance; securing of cargo; 
and occupational safety onboard. Of these, three were further selected as key areas 
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for development: systematic maintenance, the securing of cargo, and occupational 
safety onboard 
 
In particular, the accident rates of the participants from years 2005 – 2009 were 
analysed. They were found to be larger than in the oil industry, known for its very 
low accident rates, which is not surprising. However, this benchmark provides a 
good starting point for general safety development. Further, the differences between 
work categories of some companies were also found to be significant, which 
provides a good starting point for mutual development of safety details. In 
particular, we believe that the work safety of deck/engine personnel and galley 
personnel for all ships, as well as security personnel for passenger vessels will 
benefit of safety benchmarking and consequent development. The vessel type related 
information that was developed for the companies during the analysis will provide a 
good starting point for further development. 
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6  NETWORK TYPE SAFETY MANAGEMENT AMONG AUTHORITIES 
 
 




The study “Network type Safety Management among authorities” is one part of the 
METKU-project “The Development of Maritime Safety Culture” partly funded by the 
European Regional Development Fund. The project is managed by the Kotka Maritime 
Research Centre. The Health Care unit in the Kymenlaakson ammattikorkeakoulu, 
University of Applied Sciences has taken the responsibility for the study “Network type 
Safety Management among authorities” during the years 2008 – 2010. 
 
Authorities in this study were: The Finnish Boarder Guard, Finnish Coast Guard, Port 
Authorities, Rescue Services in Finland, Health and Social Care Services, Police, 
authorities taking the responsibility for the Communications and the Ministry of 
Environment. The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland has been regarded as an 
authority too. The material is collected from reports of Accident Investigation Board in 
Finland, articles in Linda data archive and by using free search concerning co-operative 
models among authorities. In addition email based survey (N=72) and 15 theme 
interviews among authorities on various levels were done. 
 
One of the main results of the study is that the co-operation among authorities is 
determined by accidents and by joint concern about the threats for the safety among the 
population. The authorities introduce experiments for co-operation and continue it 
systematically and even with joint strategies. One can notice that authorities in small 
clusters anticipate the threats, plane and organize exercises in order to train joint 
actions. Many authorities noticed further need for co-operation, but the real co-
operation took place in meetings, in some cases occasionally. The back bones in co-
operation are personal connections among colleagues working together during tens of 
years. 
 
The problems among the authorities are overlapping activities, discrepancy in rules and 
guidelines, variety’s in the structures of in management organizations, the lack of time 
and scarce economical and human resources. Additional problems are insufficient 
information about the tools, actions and organizational culture of other authorities as 
well as lacking information activities and policies for secret / not public information.   
 
Authorities for the sea: Finnish Navy, The Finnish Boarder Guard, The Finnish 
Transport Safety Agency (Trafi) work together in excellent co-operation. Ashore 
Rescue Services and Health Authorities have a joint tradition in co-operation since 100 
years. Based on the interviews carried out in the study, one can see that authorities for 
the sea are not fully aware about the actions and tools used by authorities ashore. 
Authorities ashore are not able to anticipate the consequences of maritime accidents like 
social actions needed, accommodation and emergency help. On national level there are 
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considerations about multiple independent and individual policies among municipal 
authorities with various applications concerning safety regulations. Regional authorities 
could criticize the principles in various vertical and specified organizations, that are not 
in line with each other. 
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7  CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION  
 
 
Ulla Tapaninen, University of Turku & Juha Heijari, Kotka Maritime Research Centre 
 
 
Due to increasing waterborne transportation in the Gulf of Finland, the risk of a 
hazardous accident increases and therefore manifold preventive actions are needed.  The 
ro-ro ship Estonia capsized and sunk in heavy weather in September 1994. The primary 
reason for the accident was a failure and loosing of the ship’s bow visor. Hänninen 
(2007) analysed the report of the investigation board thoroughly in his doctoral thesis 
concerning the Estonia accident. Hänninen (2007) stated that the cause of the Estonia 
accident was not only a technical failure of the bow visor, but also that there are major 
defects in the safety culture of the maritime industry. Even before the Estonia accident 
occurred, deficiencies in maritime safety culture were considered as the reason for the 
accident of the Herald of Free Enterprise (FMA, 2007). As a result, the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) has set down plenary laws and recommendations which 
are e.g., utilised in the safe operations of ships and pollution prevention. One of these 
compulsory requirements, the ISM Code, requires proactive attitude both from the top 
management and operational workers in the shipping companies. In this study, a cross-
sectional approach was taken to analyse whether the ISM Code has actively enhanced 
maritime safety in the Gulf of Finland. The analysis included; 1) performance of the 
ISM Code in Finnish shipping companies, 2) statistical measurements of maritime 
safety, 3) influence of corporate top management to the safety culture and 4) comparing 
safety management practices in shipping companies and port operations of Finnish 
maritime and port authorities. 
 
This study comprised of several extensive literature reviews, interviews of almost two 
hundred maritime professionals ranging from the ordinary seamen to the top 
management of shipping companies and representatives of maritime authorities, and 
several statistical analyses. The results of these multiple studies are summarized in this 
report. 
 
The main results found were that maritime safety culture has developed in the right 
direction after the launch of the ISM Code in the 1990´s. However, many concerns still 
remain and improvements are needed. One of the main concerns is the understanding of 
the philosophy of continuous improvement. Tools for continuous improvement should 
be developed and they should be taken into practice. The other problems include the 
lack of uniformity in the interpretation and implementation of the ISM Code. The wider 
problem in the maritime industry is the excessive bureaucracy that the ships have to 
deal with. The existing incident reporting systems is that information now flows more 
from the ships to systems and external institutions when it should be the other way 
around. Recommendations for mariners are related to risk and change management, 
strategies of safety management and resources for ensuring safety. Maritime authorities 
are expected to produce more guidance material for safety management On the other 
hand, there are good possibilities for improving safety among Finnish ship operators. 
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During the interactions with the ten volunteering companies, the attitudes in the industry 
were found to be very positive towards the development of risk management 
 
Statistical analysis shows that the overall accident risk in Finnish shipping and in 
Finnish coastal waters in general has decreased within the ISM period; the average 
severity of accidents is increasing; and a significant part of marine accidents is 
predictable. It has been demonstrated within this study that accident prone shipping 
companies can be identified by the simultaneous use of PSC and VTS reports. We 
believe that with this approach, the maritime administrations can focus their efforts on 
the most accident prone ships, either by simultaneously enforcing and supporting them 
and the companies behind them to truly follow the obligations set in the ISM Code, or 
by removing them from traffic where risky behaviour cannot be accepted.  
 
Overall, it can be stated that the old management culture in shipping i.e., a risk taking 
attitude that focuses on considerable economic result has no place on the Baltic Sea any 
longer. The concept of social responsibility has also reached shipping companies. Risk-
taking heroic operations are no longer required or even allowed, only well-defined 
processes where the safety of all the operations are guaranteed can be allowed. The time 
of courageous seamen is over; maritime business is becoming safe. 
 
In the future, we will continue to study the relationship between the level of 
performance of the safety management system and the business competitiveness of the 
shipping company. Furthermore, we will emphasise the importance of international 
cooperation between organisations, which are eager to develop maritime safety. The 
next steps in the continuous improvement will include further studies related to the 
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